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W
e present a model where groups attempt to inﬂuence policies using both bribes (plata, Spanish
for silver) and the threat of punishment (plomo, Spanish for lead). We then use it to make
predictions about the quality of a country’s public ofﬁcials and to understand the role of
institutions granting politicians with immunity from legal prosecution. The use of punishment lowers the
returns from public ofﬁce and reduces the incentives of high-ability citizens to enter public life. Cheaper
plomo and more resources subject to ofﬁcial discretion are associated with more frequent corruption and
less able politicians. This predicts that violence in a country will typically go together with corruption
and worse politicians. Moreover, the possibility of punishment changes the nature of the inﬂuence game,
so that even cheaper plata can lower the ability of public ofﬁcials. Protecting ofﬁcials from accusations
of corruption (immunity) will decrease the frequency of corruption if the judiciary is weak and may
increase the quality of politicians. These predictions cannot emerge from a traditional model where only
bribes are used.
The positive evils and dangers of the repre-
sentative, as of every other form of govern-
ment, may be reduced to two heads: ﬁrst,
general ignorance and incapacity, or, to
speak more moderately, insufﬁcient men-
tal qualiﬁcations, in the controlling body;
secondly, the danger of its being under the
inﬂuence of interests not identical with the
general welfare of the community.
— –John Stuart Mill
D
uring their ﬁrst week in ofﬁce, Colombian
judges and other public ofﬁcials involved in
the antidrug war often receive a message ask-
ing: “Plata o plomo?” The message originates from
the drug cartels and is Spanish for “Silver or lead?” It
reminds public ofﬁcials that there is an alternative to
ﬁghtingdrugsandreceivingplomo(Spanishforlead,as
in bullets) which is to not ﬁght drugs and receive plata
(Spanish for silver or money, as in a bribe). Bowden
(2001) writes about the ways of the former head of the
MedellinCartel,PabloEscobarGavir´ ıa:“Pablowases-
tablishingapatternofdealingwiththeauthorities...It
soon became known simply as plata o plomo. One ei-
theracceptedPablo’splata(silver)orhisplomo(lead).
Death was his strategy against extradition, that and
money. His policy of plata o plomo became so no-
toriously effective that it would ultimately threaten
to undermine Colombia’s democracy. Pablo’s primary
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target...was the country’s judicial system, to which
he offered plata o plomo... Plata o plomo had every
ofﬁcial in Bogot´ a living in fear or under suspicion.” 1
More generally, rewards and threats of punish-
ment have long been part of political life. Bentham
(1843), for example, argued that political inﬂuence
proceeds through “seductive” incentives, belonging to
two categories: those causing pleasure and those caus-
ing pain. In the chapter “Bribery and terrorism com-
pared,” he called the ﬁrst “pleasurable or alluring,”
or “bribery,” and the second “painfully operating,”
“coercive,” or “terrorism.” This distinction, however,
has been blurred in modern work on political inﬂu-
ence (see, e.g., Becker 1983; Peltzman 1976; and Stigler
1971). Recent work in this tradition considers the pol-
icymaker as an auctioneer who receives “bids” from
variousinterestgroups,butalwaysintheformofbribes,
campaign contributions, or other “alluring” elements
(see, e.g., Baron 1994; Grossman and Helpman 1994;
Groseclose and Snyder 1996). Politics is then reduced
to a set of transactions taking place in markets where
property rights are well deﬁned, voluntary contracts
are the norm, and the state monopolizes violence.2 In
1 PlataoPlomohasbeenobservedinothercountries:“Plataoplomo.
Silver or lead. That is the choice drug trafﬁckers in Mexico have
given their allies and enemies for years: the bribe or the bullet” (Los
Angeles Times, December 12, 1999).
2 Work in international politics has studied coercion among nations
(see, e.g., Alt, Calvert, and Humes 1988; and also Powell 1999, inter
alia). It is worth pointing out that coercive methods in domestic
politics were already observed to be in use by Adam Smith.“The
member of parliament who supports every proposal for strength-
ening this monopoly, is sure to acquire not only the reputation of
understanding trade, but great popularity and inﬂuence (...). If he
opposes them, on the contrary, and still more if he has authority
enough to be able to thwart them, neither the most acknowledged
probity, nor the highest rank, nor the greatest public services can
protect him from the most infamous abuse and detraction, from
personal insults, nor sometimes from real danger, arising from the
insolent outrage of furious and disappointed monopolists” (Smith
1981; [1776], IV.ii, 471).
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this paper, we take the view that private coercion is
possible and seek to extend the theory of political in-
ﬂuence in a more realistic direction. We allow interest
groups to exert inﬂuence not just through bribes but
also through “painfully operating” methods including
mediasmearcampaigns,legalharassmentandviolence.
We ﬁrst identify conditions under which inﬂuence will
take the “plata o plomo?” form. We then ask whether
this model can explain why countries where violence
is more widespread may also experience more corrup-
tionandworsegovernance.Thisisimportantbecauseit
meansthatthestate’smonopolyoncoercioncouldhelp
avoid nasty forms of political inﬂuence, corruption and
low quality rulers, all of which could in turn damage
economic performance.3
Introducing private coercion into political inﬂuence
not only alters our understanding of how inﬂuence af-
fects political outcomes. It also helps rationalize po-
litical institutions that would be hard to explain in a
model where only bribes exist. To illustrate, consider
the granting of immunity from legal prosecution to
France’s President, Jacques Chirac, in 2000.4 Although
it is not hard to explain why Chirac himself favored
immunity, it is harder to explain why society would
support immunity if bribes are the only method of
inﬂuence. In our model, however, immunity is a way
to insulate public ofﬁcials from threats and, in some
cases, an indirect way to increase the quality of public
ofﬁcials. Another contrasting prediction of our model
concerns the effects of political discretion and of more
room for inﬂuence. In the traditional approach, more
resources under political discretion and more room for
political inﬂuence lead to more corruption and more
bribes, which in turn make public life more attractive.
In our model, more political discretion and room for
inﬂuence lead to more corruption but, in a world with
threats, can make public ofﬁce less attractive for high
ability individuals. More generally, our approach al-
lows us to study the two “positive evils and dangers of
the representative” emphasized by Mill: that the mem-
bersoftherepresentativemaybeofinsufﬁcientmental
quality,andthattherepresentativeisinﬂuencedbyspe-
cial interests. In fact, we show that when both plata and
plomo are used, the latter evil may cause the former.
The use of threats in this paper is related to work on
maﬁa organizations (see, e.g., Gambetta 1993; Konrad
3 Our model offers— –to the best of our knowledge— –the ﬁrst formal
result on the connection between violence and corruption, and the
joint link between those two forces and the quality of rulers. Note
that violence variations may respond to exogenous elements— –such
asethnicdivisions,thatoriginateoramplifyagivenviolentpotential.
See Beissinger 2002 for an account of how ethnonationalist factors
played out in the collapse of the Soviet Union.
4 A French court ruled that President Jacques Chirac cannot be in-
vestigated while in ofﬁce in connection with a corruption scandal.
See, for example, “Court upholds Chirac’s immunity,” BBC News,
Tuesday, January 11, 2000. Immunity is also often granted to bureau-
crats (see following for examples involving Central Bank ofﬁcials).
Using the representative democracy setup of Osborne and Slivinski
(1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), it can be shown that our model
can be applied to both elected ofﬁcials (politicians) and bureaucrats.
Thus, except when otherwise noted, we use the two categories inter-
changeably.
and Skaperdas 1997; Varese 1994, inter alia) and on
conﬂict (see, e.g., Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas 1996, and
the references therein). In particular, our approach to
modelling threats is related to that in Dal B´ o and Di
Tella 2003. However, in that paper groups can only
use threats, politicians are all honest and there is no
model of entry into public life. Baron (2001) devel-
ops a related idea in his model of private politics and
corporate social responsibility. He considers an activist
who has access to a class of threats (including boycotts
and ﬁling lawsuits) when attempting to inﬂuence the
ﬁrm’s strategy. The extension to a prior entry stage
along the lines of our model could be empirically
important, particularly when the media plays a role
in developing threats.5 The work on legal origins by
Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) also discussed the possi-
bility that groups use threats to affect judges, and that
differences in the intensity of pressure determined the
typeoflegalorganizationthatemergedinEnglandand
France. Our paper is related to the literature on the
efﬁciency costs of inﬂuence (see, e.g., Becker, 1983).
Although a bribe could be considered just a transfer,
punishment involves dead weight losses in proportion
to the destruction of resources from which the group
gainsnothingdirectly.Ourpaper,however,emphasizes
another type of inefﬁciency: namely, that arising when
the equilibrium ability of public ofﬁcials is reduced be-
cause of the inﬂuence of pressure groups. Although
the groups only intend to change the policy decisions
of the ofﬁcials, the expected payoffs of the latter fall by
the use of threats, so able candidates will be less likely
to enter political careers. Interestingly, earlier work by
economists worried about the exact opposite problem,
namely, that the possibility of bribes would lead high
abilityindividualstoleavetheproductiveprivatesector
for the unproductive public sector. This point is made
explicitly in Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991 (see
Krueger 1974 for a related argument).6
DISCUSSION AND SOME EXAMPLES
The violent aspect of the “Plata o plomo?” quote may
suggest that we are referring to a (big) problem in a
small number of countries.7 But there is overwhelming
anecdotalevidenceoftheuseofatleasttwoothertypes
of punishment besides threats of physical violence: le-
gal harassment and smear campaigns in the media (the
5 The possibility that talented CEOs would not apply for the top
jobs when activism— –and media scrutiny— –are intense, is discussed in
“No Thanks: Fearing Scandals, Executives Spurn CEO Job Offers,”
page 1, The Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2002. See also Dyck and
Zingales 2002.
6 See also Caselli and Morelli (2004), who argue that low-ability
ofﬁcials can still occur in a model where groups only use bribes
if bad politicians keep their own wages low. An existing literature
studies how bad policies can emerge, with politicians of ﬁxed quality
(see, e.g., Alesina and Drazen 1991; Fernandez and Rodrik 1991;
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981, inter alia).
7 Note that violence is the norm rather than the exception. There
are 30 OECD countries with relatively secure environments (but
see Mexico, Turkey, and Italy’s south) and 189 member states in the
United Nations.
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latter include the case when groups fund negative ad-
vertising to damage a politician— –see Skaperdas and
Grofman 1995; and Lau et al. 1999, inter alia). Indeed,
politicians in less violent countries claim that their own
actions are constrained by legal harassment or smear
campaigns in the media. Mrs. Clinton, who claimed
there was a “vast right-wing conspiracy” during her
husband’s impeachment, is a famous example. Inter-
estingly, the existing literature on inﬂuence cannot ex-
plain such complaints. If groups only offer bribes, and
accepting bribes is always optional, such complaints
would not be made, and if made, they would not be
believed by anyone.
The reason why threats occur in our model— –as well
as in Dal B´ o and Di Tella 2003— –is to induce the pol-
icymaker to change his action from that preferred by
society to that preferred by the group (this might in-
volve the decision to resign). This includes situations
where the ofﬁcial yields to threats because he fears
political damage, and not personal harm. The ofﬁcial
may choose a bad decision in fear that the realization
of punishment, discrediting him or his cause, may lead
to his replacement with other candidates pursuing al-
ternate agendas thereafter. Groups could have at least
two more reasons to use threats. First, when the ofﬁcial
denies the group a favor, the announced punishment
might effectively eliminate him, perhaps allowing a
new “better disposed” ofﬁcial to take his place. This
is explicit in the case of direct violence— –see the case of
theColombianguerrilladiscussednext.Inthecaseofa
smear campaign, or legal harassment, the policymaker
may resign or be sacked as a result of the actions of the
group. Second, one could imagine that the actions of
the group make the policymaker less effective. Maybe
policymakers have a stock of political capital that is
eroded when smear campaigns force them to waste
time explaining themselves. The results of our model
are valid when groups have these other reasons to use
threats, as long as the ofﬁcial’s payoff suffers when
punishment is inﬂicted.
Physical Violence
In June 2002 the main narco-guerrilla group in
Colombia, the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolu-
cionarias de Colombia), launched a campaign to re-
place politicians who were unsympathetic to its cause.
The campaign, which included threats of kidnapping
and assassination, explicitly requested the resignation
of463outof1,098citymayorsinaregionofthecountry.
Two months later, two city mayors had been killed and
a total of 222 out of the 463 city mayors had resigned.
Former guerrilla ﬁghter turned political analyst, Le´ on
Valencia, reﬂected “It is a tremendously cheap and
efﬁcient tactic” (see “Un plan diab´ olicamente eﬁcaz,”
La Naci´ on, July 15, 2002.) Ofﬁcials in the judiciary
have also been targets of physical violence. Prilla-
man (2000) reports data compiled by the International
CommissionofJuristsindicatethat1,600ofColombia’s
4,500 judges had received death threats. Colombia’s
National Association of Judicial Employees puts the
ﬁgure closer to 50%. It was also reported that when
judicial employees went on a nationwide strike in 1989
they did not request better pay but bulletproof vests,
armored cars, escort motorcycles, and metal detectors
for court entrances.
Legal Harassment
In many cases public ofﬁcials have been subject to
lengthy judicial processes, and in some cases these
have been attributed to pressure by some interest
group. In Latin America, the practice is so frequent
that it has been given a name: the judicialization
of politics.8 An extreme case is that of the former
MalaysiandeputyPrimeMinisterAnwarIbrahim,who
wasarrestedonSeptember 20, 1998. AmnestyInterna-
tional describes the events as follows: “Subsequently,
politically motivated charges of abuse of power (al-
legedly using his ofﬁce to interfere with police in-
vestigations into alleged sexual offences and sodomy)
were ﬁled against him, after a trial which Amnesty
International considered to be unfair.” In other ex-
cerpts it writes “In order to remove Anwar Ibrahim
from political life and to discredit him publicly, those
in power in Malaysia resorted to measures including
the misuse of law, state institutions and the courts,
the ill-treatment of detainees to coerce confessions,
and the erosion of the right to a fair trial” (see
<http://www.amnesty.it/news/2000/32800900.htm>)
Biased Media Coverage
The utility of policymakers is reduced by a third type
of action by pressure groups: attacks in the press. In a
number of occasions the potential for such actions has
led politicians to be less willing to enter political races.
An example of this in the UK is the problems faced by
Michael Portillo, a candidate to lead the Conservative
Party who admitted to a homosexual past and who in
2001washesitantaboutrunningbecausehefearedthat
right-wing critics would mount an anti-gay smear cam-
paign (see The Independent, Sunday June 10, 2001.)
Such problems are even more severe when pressure
groups heavily sponsor or directly own media outlets
because of the possibility of biased coverage, which
can have ramiﬁcations for the set of feasible political
candidates. One example is Russia in the 1990s, where
seven of the top eight largest industrial groups had sig-
niﬁcant media interests. This predominance has been
linked to nothing less than Kiriyenko’s appointment as
prime minister in March 1998. “His industry pedigree
may have recommended him to the leaders of Russian
big business, [...]. The approval of these tycoons is
well worth having. They own most of the national mass
media and much of the banking industry too. They can
twist the arm or stain the reputation of any minister




judges come to decide on policies that had previously been selected
by legislatures and the executive (see, e.g., Tate and Vallinder 1995).
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THE MODEL
Themodelhastwostages.Intheﬁrststage,citizenswith
different abilities decide whether to apply for public
ofﬁceortoentertheprivatesector.Inthesecondstage,
the pressure group has the opportunity to bribe and
threaten the ofﬁcial to obtain a given resource.
First Stage: Entry Calculus by Prospective
Ofﬁcials
We assume that the economy is populated by agents
indexed with an ability parameter a ∈ [0,∞), which
we also call quality. Ability is distributed according to
the function F(a), with associated density f(a). In the
ﬁrst stage of the game, individuals decide whether to
apply for public ofﬁce or to enter the private sector.
The wage they can earn in the private sector equals
their ability. Their earnings in the public sector depend
both on the wage of the public sector and the behavior
of the pressure group. Those whose private earnings
a are lower than or equal to what they expect to get
in public ofﬁce, apply. Therefore, if individuals expect
publicofﬁcetoyieldapayoffofvalueV,alltypesa ≤ V
will apply.9 The recruitment ofﬁce chooses an individ-
ual from the pool of applicants to occupy the available
position. We assume that the recruitment ofﬁce can
observe the ability of applicants and chooses the agent
with the highest ability among the applicants.10 Then,
if individuals expect public ofﬁce to yield a payoff of
V, the public sector position will be ﬁlled with a V
type. Hence, the quality of public ofﬁcials is directly
determined by the payoff individuals expect to get by
working in the public sector.
We assume the ofﬁcial earns a ﬁxed wage w.11 In
the absence of a pressure group, the payoff V of a
public ofﬁcial is simply the wage. Thus, in the absence
of a pressure group, every individual with ability type
less than or equal to the public wage would apply to
public ofﬁce, and w would be the prevailing skill level.
If a pressure group is present, the ofﬁcial’s payoff also
depends on theoutcome ofhis dealings withthegroup.
9 For simplicity, we assume that payoffs in the private sector do
not depend on the quality of the ofﬁcial. In a more general model
we would have that a citizen’s wage in the private sector is w(a,a∗),
whereaistheabilityofthecitizenanda∗ istheabilityofthepolitician
in power; the value w(a,a∗) is increasing in both arguments, and
for any V there is an a∗ that makes w(a∗,a∗) = V.I nt h a tc a s ew e
have that given the public payoff V, the equilibrium quality will be
w(a∗,a∗) = V. The lower is V, the lower is a∗, yielding the same
results as our simpler model.
10 We emphasize that we might get bad politicians even under fault-
less recruitment screening. Our results hold under any selection pro-
cess where the expected ability of the selected politician depends
positively on the highest ability among applicants.
11 Thismightbebecauseofculturalorlegalconstraints onthepublic
wageorbecause ofﬁcials settheir ownwagesashighastheycan.The
importantassumptionisthatwagesareﬁxed.Arationalplannermay
want to manipulate w to attract better candidates to public ofﬁce.
But the effects we analyze hold for any wage level that society might
choose.Infact,alltheresultsarerobusttothegovernmentoptimally
choosingw,evenifitispossibletomakethewagelevelconditionalon
characteristics of the successful candidate. See Besley and McLaren
(1993), where the planner can (although not necessarily does) raise
wages to attract better candidates.
Note that we assume that only in the public sector
is there room for the use of bribes and threats. This
is done to capture simply a difference of degrees: we
wanttorepresentaworldinwhichthereismoreoutside
inﬂuence in the public sector than in the private sector.
This can be justiﬁed by the fact that inﬂuencing the
decisions of a private manager may be more difﬁcult
than inﬂuencing the decisions of a public ofﬁcial. This
may follow from free riding problems undermining
monitoring to a larger extent in the public sector.
Second Stage: Interaction between the
Pressure Group and the Public Ofﬁcial
In the second stage, the appointed ofﬁcial performs his
duties while interacting with the pressure group. For
concreteness, we can think of the ofﬁcial’s output as a
public good, and the level of this public good depends
positively on the ofﬁcial’s ability level. Because the
overall income of society can be expected to depend
on the amount of public good provided, it follows that
society will care about the ability level of the ofﬁcial
appointed in equilibrium. The ofﬁcial is also assumed
to have discretion on the allocation of an amount π
of resources that he can redirect toward the pressure
group. This action is modeled as a lump sum transfer.
The fact that the ofﬁcial might yield to the group’s
requestisjustdistributivelybadforthevastmajorityof
society. We abstract from any efﬁciency considerations
such as when the transfer is done through a tariff or
another distortive instrument.
The pressure group has two instruments to inﬂuence
the decisions of the ofﬁcial: bribes, b, and a threat of
punishment of variable size p, which we assume to
be credible (on reputation and extortion, see Konrad
and Skaperdas 1997 and Smith and Varese 2000. See
also Chwe 1990 on the use of credible physical pun-
ishment to incentivize workers).12 The environment is
symmetric. Delivering a bribe b costs β (b), whereas
delivering a punishment p costs ρ (p). The param-
eters β>0 and ρ>0 capture all institutional and
technological factors that affect the costs of delivering
bribes and threats, respectively, such as, for instance,
the quality of law enforcement. We now treat such
factors as exogenous, and allow for endogeneity in
our section on multiple equilibria. We assume that
 (·) and  (·) are both twice continuously differen-
tiable, and that  (0) =  (0) = 0,   (0) =   (0) = 0,
   > 0,     > 0,    > 0, and     > 0. When the ofﬁcial
receives the bribe offer and the threat of punishment,
he believes that both will be delivered in case he re-
spectively accepts or rejects the group’s proposal. We
12 For concreteness, threats can be viewed as physical violence
against the politician. An important difference between violence
and media or legal attacks is that the latter may not only create a
directdisutilitybutalsoaffectexpectedpayoffsbyalteringreelection
chances. Also in principle, a legal or media attack could backﬁre
because it may indicate that the target is honest. However, if there
is another, potentially legitimate, source of accusations, such attacks
retain their power as long as the public does not know the origin of
the report or accusation. In our section on immunity the judiciary
generates legitimate corruption accusations.
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assume the group holds all bargaining power and thus
makesatakeitorleaveitoffer.Thisisdoneforsimplic-
ity, as our results hold in models where the ofﬁcial has
some bargaining power. The preferences of the ofﬁcial
are simple: he cares linearly about money, punishment,
and the cost c of getting involved in a corrupt deal. The
latter can be seen as a moral cost, the cost of ensuring
secrecy, or the result of a detection probability.
Weassumethatwithprobability1 − γ itisimpossible
for the ofﬁcial to accept the corrupt proposal and his
only choice is to reject the offer and face the punish-
ment.13 Inthiscase,theofﬁcial’spayoffisw − p.14 With
probability γ the ofﬁcial can decide between accepting
or rejecting the corrupt deal. The ofﬁcial will accept
the bribe (and do a favor to the group) as long as his
payoff from so doing is greater than or equal to the
payoff from refusing,
w + b− c ≥ w − p. (1)
This condition implies that every ofﬁcial will accept if





{ (b,p) = γ [π − β (b)]
−(1 − γ)ρ (p)} s.t. b ≥ c − p. (2)
Denote with b∗ and p∗ the quantities maximizing
 (b,p) for an active pressure group. If  (b∗,p∗)i s
nonnegative, we say the group does indeed want to
engage in inﬂuence activities. If it is negative, we say
the group prefers to stay inactive earning no proﬁts.
When characterizing equilibrium, we will look at the
thresholdlevel ¯ π(γ,β,ρ)thatallowsthegrouptomake
money by becoming active— –that is, the level of π sat-
isfying  (b∗,p∗) = 0, given the parameter values γ, β,
and ρ. An important element in this paper will be what
we denote degree of state capture.
Deﬁnition 1. The magnitude ¯ π is an inverse measure
of the degree of state capture.
One important feature of a society is how often cor-
ruption takes place. The value ¯ π denotes the size of the
set of possible values of π for which the group cannot
engage in inﬂuence activities. One way of interpreting
13 This might be due toa circumstantial impossibility tostrike a deal,
saybecauseoftechnicalreasonsunknowntothegroup,orbecauseof
thechanceeventthattheofﬁcialisunderthescrutiny ofathirdparty
(e.g., a superior, the media, or a nongovernmental organization).
Another interpretation is that 1 − γ is a fraction of inﬁnitely honest
individuals in the population, who are incorruptible. Self-selection
across “honesty types” does not arise in equilibrium; note that the
grouphasallbargaining power,causing thetwotypestogetidentical
payoffs. Our results are also compatible with extending the model to
include a continuum of honesty types.
14 An alternative formulation has the politician obtaining w −
p
s .
This captures cases where politicians enjoy a degree of strength s
(popularity, for example), and where more popular politicians
are less vulnerable to punishment. In equilibrium threats against
stronger politicians are less virulent but still positive. We stick with
the simplest formulation as all our results are unchanged.
the measure ¯ π is as the chance that a group will not be
able to afford to corrupt the ofﬁcial.15
In the following sections, when formal results do not
follow from previous statements, the proof is relegated
to the Appendix.
RESULTS WITH BRIBES ONLY
The Equilibrium
As a benchmark, we start our analysis by setting p = 0.
Thus, westartwithastandard model where only bribes
can be used as an instrument of political inﬂuence. If
active, the pressure group will decide on an optimal
bribelevelb◦ bysolvingMaxb{ (b,0) = γ[π − β (b)]}
s.t. b ≥ c.
Because all the bargaining power is on the group’s
side, there is no point in paying a bribe higher than c.
A group will set b◦ = c when the gain π covers the
cost β (c), whereas a group with π smaller than the
thresholdvalue ¯ π0 ≡ β (b◦) = β (c)remainsinactive.
It follows that,
Lemma 1. (a) An active group offers a bribe equal to
the cost the corrupt action has for the ofﬁcial (b◦ = c).
(b)Thegrouponlybecomesactiveifthevalueofafa-
vor π is larger than the cost of the bribe (¯ π◦ ≡ β (b◦) =
β (c)).
The bribe level and the fact that the group may or
may not afford to be active fully determine the payoff
for prospective applicants to public ofﬁce. If π ≥ ¯ π,
the group is active and the payoff for the ofﬁcial is
w + b◦ − c = w.I fπ<¯ π, the group stays inactive and
the payoff for the ofﬁcial is again w. This implies that,
in a world without threats, individuals whose ability
type a satisﬁes a ≤ w will apply, and the recruiter will
appoint an ofﬁcial of type w. It follows that,
Lemma 2. In a world with only bribes, the quality of
the ofﬁcial is w regardless of whether the group is active
or not.
ROOM FOR INFLUENCE AND THE QUALITY
OF OFFICIALS IN A WORLD WITH
ONLY BRIBES
A lower value of the parameter β captures improve-
ments in the bribing technology. This could reﬂect
worse ﬁnancial monitoring, as when accounting stan-
dards are less stringent or auditing ﬁrms are less reli-
able.
15 The model can be extended so that π is drawn from a distribution
Z(·) with support in [0,∞). We then have a measure Z(¯ π) represent-
ing the probability that the group (or the fraction of groups who)
will not be able to offer “plata o plomo.” Of course, capture will be
successfulonlyafractionγ ofthesecasesand ¯ πisaninversemeasure
of the pervasiveness of capture given γ and Z(·).
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Proposition 1. More room for inﬂuence through
bribes(alowerβ)impliesahigherdegreeofstatecapture
but it does not decrease the quality of politicians.
The intuition for this result is simple. A reduction in
the cost of paying bribes allows pressure groups with
lower stakes to enter the business of bribing ofﬁcials,
increasing the degree of state capture. However, vari-
ations in the cost of bribes do not affect the quality of
politicians. This is a result of the extreme assumption
thatthegrouphasallbargainingpower.Hence,alower
cost of bribes means the group will pay the same bribe
as before (thus, leaving ofﬁcials’ payoffs unchanged),
only at a lower cost. Note, however, that were the ofﬁ-
cial to have even minimal bargaining power, his payoff
would improve when paying bribes becomes easier for
the group. Hence, in this benchmark case, the ability
of politicians tends to improve when bribes become
cheaper to use.




and we study its effect on the entry decision of ofﬁ-
cials. Then we compare the degree of state capture and
the quality of politicians with the values obtained in a
world without threats. We start by studying the opti-
mal bribes and threats “offered” by an active pressure
group. From expression (1) we know that, given some
p, the most convenient bribe is b = c − p. Paying more
will not convince an incorruptible ofﬁcial, and paying
just that is enough to make the other type accept doing
favorstothegroup.Inaddition,giventhatthemarginal
cost of starting to use any of the two instruments is
zero, an active pressure group must use both bribes
and threats (if bribes had a positive marginal cost at
zero, making punishments costly enough at the margin
would guarantee an interior solution).
We study now the conditions under which a pres-
sure group will decide to be active. The pressure group
would like to be active if the optimal bribes and threats
(b∗,p∗) result in positive proﬁts. Then, the pressure
group makes the “plata o plomo” offer (b∗,p∗)i f
 (b∗,p∗) ≥ 0, and chooses to stay inactive otherwise.
Given that the proﬁts of the active pressure group are
increasing in π and there is a positive cost to inﬂuence
the ofﬁcial, there exists a critical value ¯ π under which
the pressure group would rather not exert pressure. By
settingthegroup’sexpectedpayofftozero,weﬁndthat
this critical value is ¯ π ≡
(1−γ)
γ ρ (p∗) + β (c − p∗).
More formally,
Lemma 3. (a) An active group uses both bribes and
threats and the total amount of pressure equals the cost
to the ofﬁcial of a corrupt action (b∗ > 0, p∗ > 0, b∗ +
p∗ = c).
(b) The group only becomes active if the expected
beneﬁt γπ is larger or equal than the total cost (1 −
γ)ρ (p∗) + γβ (c − p∗) of the exerted pressure (i.e., if





ρ (p∗) + β (c − p∗)).
If π is above the critical level ¯ π, the pressure group
uses both bribes and threats to inﬂuence the ofﬁcial.
The threat allows the pressure group to inﬂuence the
ofﬁcial without paying the full cost of changing the
decision.Itneedstopayonlyc − p∗ (Lemma3-a)when
threats are available, whereas it needs to pay c in a
world without threats.
Proposition 2. (comparison of Lemmas 1-a and 3-a)
Bribeoffersarelowerinaworldwithbribesandthreats.
This result captures a simple fact: if politicians are
being coerced by groups they will tend to sell their
favors relatively cheaply. Tullock (1997) has pointed
out that lobbying activities seem to involve too little
money relative to the amount of resources that special
interests can obtain from the political process. See also




ity of the ofﬁcial, but before we can do this we need
to determine the equilibrium payoffs for the ofﬁcial.
First note that in a world with bribes and threats and
an active group, the ofﬁcial obtains w − p∗ regardless
of his action. The reason is that if the ofﬁcial refuses
to do favors for the group, punishment is inﬂicted and
the ensuing payoff is w − p∗. If the ofﬁcial yields, he
faces a moral cost and receives a bribe, and the pay-
offisw + b∗ − c = w + c − p∗ − c = w − p∗.Whenthe
group is inactive the payoff is simply w. Thus, ofﬁcial
payoffs are either w − p∗ when the group is active and
w when the group is inactive. Because citizens with
ability higher than the payoff from public ofﬁce do not
even apply, we directly obtain,
Lemma 4. Inaworldwithbribesandthreats,thequal-
ity of ofﬁcials is w − p∗if the group is active and w if it
is not.
This last result immediately allows us to establish
that,
Proposition 3. (comparison of Lemmas 2 and 4) The
quality of the ofﬁcial is lower in a world with threats.
A fundamental feature of our model is that the
availability of threats lowers the entry barrier to the
inﬂuence activity. Active pressure groups use threats
and enjoy proﬁt levels that are higher than those in a
world with only bribes. Therefore, the set of values of
π for which the group is active is larger in a world with
threats than in a world without them.
Proposition 4. (comparison of Lemmas 1-b and 3-b)
The degree of state capture is higher when threats are
available (i.e., ¯ π<¯ π0).
If ¯ π is interpreted as the inverse of a measure of the
number of active groups dealing with ofﬁcials across
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society (since only groups with π>¯ π are active), the
message of our last proposition is that a world with
threats features more frequent corruption. We turn
now to studying the effects of parameter changes af-
fecting the scope for political inﬂuence.
Cheaper Inﬂuence and the Quality of
Ofﬁcials in a World with Bribes and Threats
We establish our main results in this subsection. We
study the effect of changes in the cost of bribes and
threats on the behavior of the pressure group, the de-
gree of state capture, and the quality of politicians. A
decreaseinthecostofbribesmakesbribesmoreattrac-
tivefor an active group, who then substitutesbribes for
threats. In the same way, after a decrease in the cost of
threats an active group substitutes threats for bribes.
Formally,
Lemma 5. (a)Moreroomforinﬂuencethroughbribes
(i.e., a lower β) implies weaker threats and higher bribes
by an active group (
dp ∗
dβ > 0, db∗
dβ < 0), whereas
(b) More room for inﬂuence through threats (i.e.,
al o w e rρ) implies stronger threats and lower bribes
(
dp ∗
dρ < 0, db∗
dρ > 0) by an active group.
Itisimportanttocharacterizehowchangesinβandρ
affect our measure of state capture. A decrease in any
of the two cost parameters will necessarily increase
the proﬁts of an active pressure group, resulting in
an increase in the set of values of π that allow the
pressure group to be active. When inﬂuence— –either
throughbribesorthroughthreats— –becomeslesscostly,
the threshold ¯ π goes down, implying that groups with
lower stakes will be able to afford inﬂuencing ofﬁcials
throughthe“plataoplomo” mechanism.Thisamounts
tosayingthatsocietieswheregroupshaveeasieraccess
to bribing and punishment technologies can expect to
have more pervasive corruption. In other words,
Proposition 5. More room for inﬂuence through ei-
ther bribes (al o w e rβ) or threats (al o w e rρ) increases
the degree of state capture.
We can now establish results relating changes in the
costs of bribes and threats to changes in the quality of
politicians.
Proposition 6. (a) More room for inﬂuence through
bribes(alo werβ)hasanambiguouseffectonthepayoff
of ofﬁcials and their quality.
(b) More room for inﬂuence through threats (a
lower ρ) decreases the payoff of ofﬁcials, lowering their
quality.
The intuition for part (a) is as follows. Consider an
ofﬁcial facing a group that is active both before and
after β goes down. This ofﬁcial’s payoff must increase
because a lower β implies lower threats and higher
bribes (Lemma 5-a). This would go in the “traditional”
direction: more inﬂuence through bribes tends to im-
prove the ofﬁcial’s payoff, and hence, the quality of
politicians. However, from Proposition 5 we know that
alowerβwillcausesomegroupswithπslightlybelow ¯ π
to become active. These groups will optimally use both
bribes and threats, so the ofﬁcials facing such groups
will see their payoffs decrease from w to w − p∗.I na
world with threats, the fact that paying bribes gets eas-
ier implies a lower barrier to entry to the plata o plomo
inﬂuencebusiness.Andthisbusinesslowersthepayoffs
of ofﬁcials. If enough groups lie in the range where a
decrease in β switches them into activity, the overall
effect of cheaper bribes on expected ofﬁcial payoffs
will be negative. This could never happen in a model
with only bribes (Proposition 1). In our model, higher
levelsofcapturefollowingfromgroupsﬁndingiteasier
to pay bribes may be associated with worse politicians,
and not merely with more frequent wrongdoing. This
is an example of how the simultaneous availability of
both instruments of inﬂuence alters the nature of the
inﬂuence game.
We turn now to part (b). A lower ρ would reﬂect a
world where it is cheaper to hire thugs, inﬂuence the
media, or manipulate the judicial system. A lower cost
of threats can have two effects. First, if the group was
active before, a lower ρ will result in a more intensive
use of threats (Lemma 5-b), lowering the payoff of
the ofﬁcial and her equilibrium quality. Second, if the
group was not active before, alower ρmay resultinthe
group becoming active (Proposition 5), again lowering
the ofﬁcial’s payoff. Therefore, cheaper punishments
can only result in ofﬁcials that obtain lower payoffs
and are of lower quality (yielding Proposition 6b). This
suggests that societies where groups have easier access
to punishment technologies will tend to have more fre-
quent corruption and worse politicians.
One might think that if society is governed by politi-
cians of low ability because threats are high, someone
will want to raise public wages in order to attract bet-
ter candidates. This might indeed be the case. But for
any level of wages chosen by the public, the quality of
politicians will be worse when threats exist and groups
ﬁnd iteasier toexert inﬂuence, relative towhen threats
are more expensive to use or are simply not available.
Furthermore, the public may need to pay very large
wages if the threats involve physical violence, so it may
be more cost-effective to direct resources to limiting
the scope for political inﬂuence.
Discretion, Corruption, and the Quality
of Politicians
Economists associate bureaucratic discretion with
wasteful rent-seeking (see Krueger 1974, and Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny 1991, inter alia; Ades and Di Tella
1999, present evidence consistent with the hypothesis
thatrentscause corruption). But even ifstateinterven-
tion generates opportunities for corruption, there will
still be occasions when some intervention is justiﬁed.
Thus,weaskhowlevelsofstatecaptureandthequality
of politicians would evolve if we enlarge the size of
resources under ofﬁcial discretion.
From previous sections, we know that in a world
with threats the quality of politicians is lower when the
pressuregroupisactiveandthatthepressuregroupwill
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be active only if the amount of resources it can get cov-
ers bribing and threatening costs (π ≥ ¯ π). Therefore, a
decrease in the amount of resources subject to ofﬁcial
discretion π to a value below ¯ π results in the pressure
group becoming inactive and, hence, in an increase in
the payoff and quality of politicians. Summarizing,
Proposition 7. A decrease in the amount of resources
subject to ofﬁcial discretion has a positive effect on the
quality of politicians.
Thus, more political discretion may not only lead to
morewastethroughrentseeking,butitwillalsoleadto
a higher fraction of corrupt decisions and politicians of
lower quality. Note that this result abstracts from the
possibility that greater ofﬁcial discretion may directly
appeal to high quality citizens, because it allows them
more freedom to use their skills. Traditional models of
corruption in which the ofﬁcial has some bargaining
power would also result in a positive relation between
discretion and quality. Although the baseline hypothe-
sis is that discretion has a positive effect on the quality
of politicians, Proposition 7 isolates a force working in
theoppositedirection,duetotheeffectofpunishments.






for policymakers, ranging from immunity from libel
for statements made during parliamentary debates, to
protectionagainstcriminalcharges.Immunityhasbeen
debated around the ﬁgure of elected politicians, as in
the case of former U.S. President Clinton, as well as
in relation to appointed bureaucrats, such as central
bankers. Indeed, the granting of immunity to the pres-
ident and board of directors of the Central Bank of
Argentina (BCRA) was the key request of the IMF
during negotiations in 2002 in the context of the econ-
omy’s collapse. Given the weakness of the country’s
judicial institutions, banks affected by the decisions of
the Central Bank found it easy to initiate legal actions
against bank regulators (Bernhard [1998] discusses po-
litical determinants of central bank independence).
With two unfulﬁlled vacancies in the directorate and
the banking system in a severe crisis, the new president
of the BCRA, Mario Blejer, publicly asked that legal
immunitybegranted,partlybecauseofdifﬁcultieswith
attracting distinguished professionals to the bank’s di-
rectorate. Blejer resigned after Congress rejected the
immunity proposal. The general problem has been de-
scribed in the recent banking literature, by Gale and
Vives(2002):“Arelatedproblem(inArgentina,forex-
ample) is the lack of legal protection that a supervisor
has when attempting to discipline a bank in trouble.
Then even if the perceived problem is serious the bank
may be allowed to continue or even granted help.”
In terms of our model, immunity has two effects. On
the one hand, it beneﬁts honest ofﬁcials by insulating
them from judicial actions manipulated by a pressure
group.Ontheotherhand,itmakescorruptofﬁcialsless
accountable to an independent judiciary. Clearly the
impact of the threats will depend on the quality of the
judiciary. To investigate these effects further, we now
modifythemodeltoincludetheeffectofimmunityand
the quality of the judiciary. Assume that accepting the
group’s offer implies a gamble. A fraction θ ∈ [0,1] of
ofﬁcials accepting bribes are detected. This parameter
θ also summarizes another dimension of judicial efﬁ-
cacy: a fraction θ of politically motivated accusations
are discarded (the two aspects of judicial effectiveness
in the model could be captured by two different pa-
rameters, but for simplicity we stick with the simplest
speciﬁcation here). When caught, bribed ofﬁcials lose
their wage, the bribe received, and they pay a moral
cost m. When not caught, corrupt ofﬁcials keep both
wages and bribes, and only pay the moral cost m asso-
ciated with wrongdoing (the reader may want to think
we have decomposed the cost c of the basic model
into two parts: one part associated with the probability
of detection, and a straight moral cost). Immunity is
parameterized with i ∈ [0,1]. A simple way to study
immunity is to postulate that a degree of immunity
i does two things. First, it reduces the probability of
detection by independent judges to θ(1 − i); complete
immunity (i.e., i = 1), then, makes corrupt ofﬁcials un-
detectable, whereas no immunity (i = 0) makes them
fully detectable (at the usual rate of discovery by the
judicial system, θ). The other effect of immunity is to
mitigatetheimpactoffalseaccusationsthatarenotdis-
carded by the judiciary, so that a threat of punishment
p through legal harassment becomes (1 − i)(1 − θ)p.
As a result, an ofﬁcial accepting bribes makes
(w + b)[1 − θ(1 − i)] − m, (3)
whereas one rejecting them receives
w − (1 − i)(1 − θ)p. (4)
Note that in this model a politically motivated legal
attack does not reveal that the ofﬁcial is in fact hon-
est, because the legal action could stem from the au-
tonomousactionofthejudiciary.(Asimilarmechanism
can make smears effective: they could be the result of
honest reporting by independent media.) Hence, al-
though a legal attack will not fully convince the public
that the accused person is guilty, it will increase the
perception that he is, relative to the no accusation sce-
nario. Thus, a legal attack can still be painful for exam-
ple by lowering reelection chances. Rundquist, Strom,
and Peters (1977) present an early study of politically
motivatedaccusations;GoldenandChang(2004)show
thatjudicialinvestigationsinItalycanindeedlowerthe
reelection chances of accused legislators.
To understand the role of immunity, note that
changesinimmunityaffectboththeutilitythatapoliti-
cian derives from accepting the corrupt deal and the
utility from rejecting it— –see expressions (3) and (4)
earlier. These expressions tell us that when justice is
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relatively ineffective (θ is low), immunity has a greater
effect on protecting the honest politician from false
accusations than on sheltering the corrupt politician
from true justice. Then, when the judiciary is relatively
ineffective, increases in immunity will result in the in-
terest group having to incur higher pressure costs in
ordertoaffectthebehaviorofthepolitician.Inthiscase
higher immunity makes corruption more expensive to
groups, and thus fewer groups should be able to afford
it. On the contrary, when justice is relatively effective,
an increase in immunity has a higher effect on shelter-
ing the corrupt politician than on protecting the honest
one, reducing the costs of pressure and increasing state
capture.
Proposition 8. Ifjusticeisrelativelyineffective,higher
immunity reduces state capture, whereas if justice is rel-
ativelyeffectivehigherimmunityincreasesstatecapture.
The importance of this proposition is that it shows
that the paradoxical beneﬁcial effect of immunity ex-
ists, providing a counterpoint to standard crime deter-
rence theory (see Shavell 2004, Section V, and refer-
ences therein). But the result is nuanced: the beneﬁcial
effect of immunity is only present if justice is ineffec-
tive enough. (Note that the presence of both bribes
and threats is key for this subtlety. In a world with
only bribes, more immunity always increases capture,
whereas in a world with only threats, more immunity
always reduces capture.) Therefore, debates regarding
whether certain ofﬁcials should receive immunity in
order to act more independently cannot take place
without considering the general situation of justice
in the country. Countries that have a good judiciary
may not beneﬁt from this institution. In a country like
Argentina, however, where the judicial system is rel-
atively corrupt and ineffective, various institutions
granting legal immunity to policymakers may play a
useful role and diminish corruption, even when lower-
ing the (already low) probability that bribe takers get
caught.
We now analyze the link between immunity and the
quality of ofﬁcials. Immunity may act in two ways. It
may affect the proportion of active groups and also
the relative use of bribes and threats by active groups.
To isolate the impact of the second channel, we now
abstract from the ﬁrst force and take it as given that
variations in immunity will not drive the group out
of the pressure game. The impact of immunity on the
ability of politicians can be studied by looking at the
equilibrium utility of ofﬁcials: w − (1 − i)(1 − θ)p∗(i).
Differentiating this expression with respect to i we get
(1 − θ)p∗(i) − (1 − i)(1 − θ)
dp ∗




with an active pressure group, a sufﬁcient condition for
higher immunity to improve the quality of politicians is




it can be shown that an increase in immunity will result
in a reduction in the use of threats by active pressure
groups, thus raising the quality of politicians.
Proposition 9. With an active pressure group and a
relatively effective judicial system, an increase in immu-
nity improves the quality of politicians.
Note that Proposition 9 provides a sufﬁcient but
not necessary condition for an increase in immunity
to improve the quality of politicians. There are cases
where increases in immunity result in an increase in
politicians’payoffsandqualityevenwithanineffective
justice. As said earlier, changes in immunity may also
affect the quality of politicians through changes in the
degree of state capture. Our working paper elaborates
on the interaction of the two channels through which
immunity may affect the quality of politicians. There
we explain how a society with a good judiciary may
face a trade off when deciding on the optimal amount
ofimmunity:whereasmoreimmunitymayimprovethe
quality of politicians, it will do so at the cost of more
frequent corruption.
Multiple Equilibria
Our basic model features a unique equilibrium where
the parametric costs of inﬂuence determine the degree
of capture, the payoff of ofﬁcials, and the quality of
politicians. Thus, one can think of countries with lots
of corruption and bad bureaucracies as suffering the
consequences of cheap plomo. Another way to explain
varying levels in the quality of politicians is that dif-
ferent countries “live” in different equilibria. In our
model, multiplicity of equilibria arises naturally if the
quality of politicians affects the scope of threats being
used. One possibility is that if politicians are gener-
ally expected to be of low quality, a smear campaign
may be easier to organize. Another plausible channel
is that bad politicians may provide fewer public goods
of which law enforcement may be one example. This
may enhance the ability of groups to threaten ofﬁcials,
thus lowering the expected payoff of the latter, and
therefore their equilibrium quality. On the contrary,
high-quality politicians will provide tight law enforce-
ment, thus reducing the chances of punishments being
used. This should raise the expected payoff of ofﬁcials
and, consequently, their quality in equilibrium.
Denote with gt the level of the public good avail-
able in period t. This represents the quality of law
enforcement, or the amount of antilibel regulation in
the media industry, prevailing in period t. Assume also
that gt depends simply on the quality of ofﬁcials during
period t − 1:gt = at−1, denoting a world where the
quality of law enforcement today depends on the qual-
ity of the people that have been responsible for it in
the immediate past. A higher level of g will typically
imply a higher value of ρ: the total and marginal costs
of exerting pressure through threats go up with tighter
law enforcement or stricter antilibel regulations. So we
will write ρ(g), where ρ  > 0. For simplicity, suppose
that g does not affect β. We showed in the previous
section that the payoff of politicians (call it V(b∗,p∗))
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FIGURE 1. Multiple Equilibria in the Quality
of Politicians and Public Goods
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was increasing in ρ: if the group stays active after an
increase in ρ, the lower threats and higher bribes imply
ahigherpayofffortheofﬁcial.Ifanincreaseinρbrings
about the group switching to inactivity, this raises the
payoff of the ofﬁcial discretely from w − p∗ to w.L e t
us for simplicity focus on a range of variation of ρ
such that the group is always active and increases in
ρ bring about improvements in the payoff of politi-
cians in a continuous way. As in this case the payoff
V(b∗,p∗) = w − p∗(ρ) is increasing in ρ, then it is also
increasing in g. We can then write V (g) > 0.
We now show how multiple equilibria can arise (not
that they deﬁnitely will), and that some of them could
be “bad,” in the sense that appointing bad politicians
reinforces the conditions that make bad politicians the
only ones to be available. A reasonable assumption is
that higher levels of the public good have diminishing
marginal returns in terms of the improvements they
produce on the payoff of politicians. Hence,
d2V{·}
dg2 < 0.
Moreover, if the prevailing level of g is zero, we can
assume that ρ attains some lower bound, threats are
very high, and hence the payoff of politicians is very
low. Note, nothing prevents V(b∗,p∗) from being
negative for some very low ρ. In this case no citizen
would apply for public ofﬁce, g would be zero and the
group would presumably obtain π without having to
deal with any ofﬁcial.
The horizontal axis in the ﬁgure above measures
two variables. On the one hand it measures gt,t h e
prevailing level of the public good in the economy
at period t. On the other, it measures at, the ability
of an individual considering applying for public of-
ﬁce in period t. The vertical axis measures payoffs
from being in the private and public sector in pe-
riod t. The former are given by the ability of each
individual (through the 45 degree line), whereas the
latter are given by V(gt). Note that, in any period t,
Vt = V(gt) = V(at−1) = V[V(gt−1)] = V(Vt−1), and eq-
uilibriumischaracterizedbyVt = Vt−1,orgt = gt−1 (i.e.
by the intersections of the 45 degree line and V(gt)).
To see how we can get multiple equilibria, suppose
that, being concave, V(gt) cuts the 45 degree line twice:
ﬁrst at a level ¯ g and then at a higher level ˆ g.S t a r t
with a public good level g  < ¯ g. This generates an an-
ticipated reward from entering public service of V(g ).
NowﬁndingthereﬂectionofV(g )inthehorizontalaxis
we see that an individual with type a  = g  would earn
precisely a  = g  > V(g ) in the private sector. Thus, no
individual with a type higher than or equal to V(g )
would enter the public sector. So if the ofﬁcials pro-
ducing the public good in t − 1 were of type a  = g 
(they must have been if the public good level was g )
they would quit and leave their posts to people with
lower types. This process would go on for any public
good level g < ¯ g. So if a society starts anywhere below
¯ g, it would converge to a bad equilibrium in which
g = 0. This is a situation in which there is no law en-
forcement and groups can reduce the utility of ofﬁcials
with great ease. Thus, any individual with the ability
to earn positive amounts in the private sector will stay
out of public life. In this situation, the pressure group
appropriates π without having to deal with any ofﬁcial.
For g = ¯ g, we have an unstable equilibrium. And for
g > ¯ g, a similar argument to that one just made for
g < ¯ g ensures society will tend to enjoy a public good
of size ˆ g. This willallow higher rewards frompublic life




We develop a model where pressure groups use both
plata(carrots)andplomo(sticks)wheninﬂuencingpol-
icy. Standard models only consider carrots, but there is
overwhelming evidence on the use of positive and neg-
ative incentives (including violence, legal harassment,
and smear campaigns). We show that allowing for a
more realistic model yields different testable predic-
tions.
Ourmodelhastwostages.Intheﬁrst,citizensdecide
to enter public life depending on the total expected
payoff received by public ofﬁcials. In the second stage,
the ofﬁcial is inﬂuenced by a pressure group that has
access to both a bribe and a threat technology. Both
instruments are used in equilibrium, explaining the
nonrhetorical nature of the “Plata o Plomo?” ques-
tion. This is unfortunate because punishments intro-
duce an element of inefﬁciency. Although bribes are
mainly transfers, punishment typically entails the de-
struction of resources. The reason inefﬁcient actions
are used is because they allow the group to save on
bribes. Indeed, in equilibrium political favors are ex-
changedforrelativelysmallsumsofmoney,aresultthat
can help rationalize— –at least in part— –Tullock’s (1997)
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observation that there seems to be too little money
devoted to political inﬂuence in the United States.
Another element of inefﬁciency introduced by the
“Plata o Plomo?” inﬂuence game is that the equilib-
rium payoff to— –and hence quality of— –public ofﬁcials
falls relative to inﬂuence games with only bribes. In
contrast to previous work, state capture— –and the fac-
tors that facilitate it, such as violence, discretion and
a weak judiciary— –tends to be associated in our model
with ofﬁcials of low ability. Interestingly, when threats
are present, more scope for inﬂuence through bribes
may also lead to public ofﬁcials of lower quality. This
counterintuitive result shows that the use of threats
changes the nature of the inﬂuence game. Another
testablepredictionfromourmodelisthatmoreviolent
countries— –where threats are cheaper— –will have more
corruptionandworsepoliticians.Wediscusstwoexten-
sions: how countries may want to grant immunity from
legal prosecution to some ofﬁcials that can be (falsely)
accused of corruption and other crimes; and how mul-
tiple equilibria can arise when a bad environment (e.g.,
violence) leads to low-ability people in ofﬁce, who are
then incapable of altering the conditions that make
good candidates stay away from politics.
An important question is how does a country with
high corruption and bad ofﬁcials change for the better.
Our basic model emphasizes that gradual restrictions
of the scope for private coercion (for instance, through
better judiciary and independent media) will gradually
reduce corruption and improve the quality of politi-
cians. Our multiple equilibria extension suggests the
possibility that temporary crackdowns may take the
system from a bad equilibrium to a good one, perma-
nently improving matters. A full analysis of transitions
awayfromregimesdisplayinghighcorruptionandlow-
quality ofﬁcials is left for future research.
This paper has concerned itself with showing that
the two evils of representative government identiﬁed
by John Stuart Mill— –it being under the inﬂuence of
special interests, and it being constituted by men of in-
sufﬁcientquality— –areconnected.Thus,andincontrast
to the traditional literature, it is possible to argue that
the government being under the inﬂuence of special
interests will lead to “general ignorance and incapac-
ity, or, to speak more moderately, insufﬁcient mental
qualiﬁcations, in the controlling body.”
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Since
∂¯ π0
∂β =  (c) > 0, a lower β
increasesstatecapture.AndfromLemma2thequalityofthe
ofﬁcial is always w, so changes in β do not affect quality. 
Proof of Lemma 3. (a) The ofﬁcial will accept the bribe
if w + b− c ≥ w − p. Therefore, given p, an active pressure
group would choose to pay b = c − p. The problem of the
active pressure group then becomes
Max
p
 (b(p),p) = γ{π − β (c − p)}−(1 − γ)ρ (p),
which has the following ﬁrst-order condition for an interior
maximum:
γβ 
 (c − p) − (1 − γ)ρ 
 (p) = 0. (5)
Because γβ  (c) − (1 − γ)ρ  (0) > 0, γβ  (0) − (1 −
γ)ρ  (c) < 0 and both    and    are continuous, by the
intermediate value theorem, there exists p∗ ∈ (0,c)t h a t
satisﬁes (5). (If we treat bribes as straight transfers so
that β (b) = b, ensuring an interior solution requires the
assumption that increasing threats is costly enough at p = c:





  (c − p) − (1 − γ)ρ 
  (p) < 0. (6)
From b = c − p, we alsohave that b∗ ∈ (0,c) and bothp∗ and
b∗ are strictly positive. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Given that by Lemma 3
p∗ > 0, then p = 0 is a binding restriction in the no threat
case and  (b∗,p∗) >  (b◦,p = 0). Then, γβ (c) >γ β   (c −
p∗) + (1 − γ)ρ (p∗), and
¯ π





∗) = ¯ π. 








γ  (c − p∗)
γβ   (c − p∗) + (1 − γ)ρ 
  (p∗)
> 0.
(b) Evaluate (5) at p∗ (ρ), differentiate with respect to ρ,
and solve for
dp ∗




−(1 − γ)  (p∗)
γβ   (c − p∗) + (1 − γ)ρ 
  (p∗)
< 0.
Because b∗ = c − p∗,
dp ∗
dβ > 0 implies
db∗
dβ < 0, and
dp ∗
dρ < 0i m -
plies
db∗
dβ > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5. This follows from differentiat-
ing the threshold ¯ π(β,ρ) = β (c − p∗) +
(1−γ)
γ ρ (p∗) with
respect to β and ρ, respectively, taking into account
(5) and that p∗ is a function of (β,ρ).W et h e n
get the result
d¯ π(β,ρ)




γ ρ  (p∗)
dp ∗
dβ +
 (c − p∗) =  (c–p∗) > 0, and
d¯ π(β,ρ)








γ  (p∗) =
(1–γ)
γ  (p∗) > 0. 
ProofofProposition6. (a)Letβ>β  .FromProposition
4 we have that ¯ π(β) ≥ ¯ π(β ) and there are three cases to
consider. First, the group is active under both β and β .F r o m
Lemma 4, the payoff of the ofﬁcial is w − p∗ if the group is
active and from Lemma 5
dp ∗
dβ > 0, so V(β ) > V(β). Second,
the group is inactive under both β and β . From Lemma 4
the payoff of the ofﬁcial is w in both cases. Third, the group
is inactive under β but active under β . From Lemmas 2 and
4 the payoff of the ofﬁcial is w under β and w − p∗ under
β .S i n c ep∗ > 0 by Lemma 3, V(β ) < V(β). Thus, changes in
the cost of bribes have ambiguous effects on the payoff and
quality of the ofﬁcial.
(b) Let ρ>ρ  . From Proposition 4 we have that ¯ π(ρ) ≥
¯ π(ρ ) and there are three cases to consider. First, the group
is active under both ρ and ρ . From Lemma 4, the payoff of
the ofﬁcial is w − p∗ if the group is active, and from Lemma 5
dp ∗
dρ < 0, so V(ρ) > V(ρ ). Second, the group is inactive under
both ρ and ρ . From Lemma 2 the payoff of the ofﬁcial is w
in both cases. Third, the group is inactive under ρ but active
under ρ . From Lemmas 2 and 4 the payoff of the ofﬁcial is
w under β and w − p∗ under β .S i n c ep∗ > 0b yL e m m a3 ,
V(ρ) > V(ρ ). Therefore, lower costs of threats reduce the
payoff and quality of the ofﬁcial. 
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Proof of Proposition 8. An active group will pay the
lowest bribe possible given p:
b(i,p) =
[(θw − (1 − θ)p](1 − i) + m
1 − θ(1 − i)
. (7)




(1−i)(1−θ). The ﬁrst-order condition for an interior level of






− (1 − γ)ρ 
 (p
∗) = 0. (8)
The left-hand side in (8) is positive for p = 0 and neg-
ative for p = p, and both    and    are continuous, so
by the intermediate value theorem there exists p∗ ∈ (0,p)
that satisﬁes (8). In addition, it is easy to show that
p∗ is continuous in the parameters of the model. (The
second-order condition for a maximum is also easy to
check). State capture is given by our measure ¯ π, now
reading
(1−γ)
γ ρ [p∗ (i,θ)] + β [b(i,p∗ (i,θ))]. Differentiat-
ing this with respect to i and using the envelope theorem one
gets
d¯ π




∂i is the direct effect of
i on b. Obviously, sgn(
d¯ π
di ) = sgn(
∂b






p∗ depends on θ.S i n c ep∗ > 0w h e nθ = 0, 0 <
p∗(i,0)
w+m+p∗(i,0).
Sincep∗ doesnotconvergetoinﬁnityasθ → 1(thisargument
holds for i > 0, but it is easy to alter the model slightly so
that the proof is also valid when i = 0),
p∗(i,θ)
w+m+p∗(i,θ) is strictly
lower than θ for θ close enough to 1. Then, given that p∗ is
continuous in θ, there exist θ ∈ (0,1) and θ ∈ (0,1) such that
θ ≤ θ,
∂b
∂i > 0f o rθ<θand
∂b





di < 0i fθ>θ. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Asufﬁcientconditionforhigher
immunity to improve the payoff (hence, the ability) of politi-
c i a n si st h a t
dp ∗
di < 0. The term
dp ∗
di can be obtained as the ﬁrst
ordercomparativestaticeffectofi onp:evaluate(8)atp∗(i),








    ∂b
∂i
∂b
∂p +    d2b
dp di

−γβ   (b∗)
 ∂b
∂p∗
2 − (1 − γ)ρ   
,
where the denominator is clearly negative. Thus, the sign
of
dp ∗
di depends on the sign of the numerator, and
dp ∗
di will
be negative whenever     ∂b
∂i
∂b
∂p +    d2b
dp di > 0 holds. This last
inequality holds if θ ≥
p∗
w+m+p∗ (as this implies that
∂b
∂i < 0,
and we have that
db
dp < 0a n d
d2b
dp di > 0). This is, from the proof
of Proposition 7,
dp ∗
di < 0i fθ ≥ θ. 
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